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Abstract: A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to 
lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four 
behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short 
scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evi-
dence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on 
judging that the agent made an assertion (assertion attributions), and, at least in some contexts, 
are not based on attributions of deceptive intent. The finding on assertion attributions is predicted 
by the standard view, but the finding on intent attributions is not. These results help to further 
clarify the ordinary concept of lying and shed light on the psychological processes involved in 
ordinary lie attributions and related judgments. 
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Introduction 
A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion (e.g. Augus-
tine, 395; Aquinas, 1273; Vrij, 2008). On this view, lying is defined as asserting something that 
you think is false in order to deceive your audience. Otherwise put, making a dishonest assertion 
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is necessary and sufficient for lying. 
Recently this view has been challenged on several fronts, at least when understood as an 
attempt to characterize the ordinary, shared concept of lying. First, results from several studies 
suggest that the ordinary concept of lying is not properly defined in terms of a “checklist” of 
necessary and sufficient conditions but instead is a prototype concept (Coleman & Kay, 1981; 
Lee & Ross, 1997). According to this view, assertions are judged to be lies based on how closely 
they resemble a prototypical lie, with no particular feature being necessary for lying. Second, 
results from other studies suggest that objective falsity is centrally important to the ordinary con-
cept of lying (Strichartz & Burton, 1990; Turri & Turri, 2015). Some of these results suggest that 
when someone makes an assertion she mistakenly believes is false, she did not lie but, rather, 
only thinks she lied. Third, results from another study arguably suggest that deceptive intent is 
inessential to the ordinary concept of lying (Arico & Fallis, 2013). Finally, some have argued 
that in addition to semantic properties, the ordinary concept of lying is partly constituted by so-
cial and contextual factors, such as the perceived purpose of a conversational exchange 
(Sweetser, 1987). For instance, people are more willing to classify an assertion as a lie when it is 
spoken in a context where information-exchange, rather than politeness, is the principal goal 
(Lee & Ross, 1997).  
In this paper, we report a new series of experiments designed to advance knowledge of the 
ordinary concept of lying, in two broad ways. First, we studied the potential role of audience up-
take on people’s willingness to categorize an assertion as a lie. More specifically, we studied 
whether lie attributions are affected by an audience’s ability to hear what the speaker said, an au-
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dience’s ability to comprehend the speaker’s language, and even whether there is an audience at 
all. Second, we studied whether people’s lie attributions are based on their attributions of asser-
tion and deceptive intent. More specifically, we used mediation analysis to determine whether 
the effect of audience uptake on lie attributions is mediated by assertion attributions. We also 
used regression analysis and causal search to investigate whether people’s lie attributions are 
caused by the attribution of deceptive intent. In order to accomplish this, we collected people’s 
judgments about assertion and intent. Surprisingly, prior work on lie attributions has typically 
assumed that participants interpreted these critical variables in the relevant way. 
Experiment 1 tests whether lie attributions are affected by the audience’s ability to hear the 
agent’s spoken words, and whether such an effect is mediated by assertion attributions. Experi-
ment 2 tests whether lie attributions are affected by the presence of an audience. Experiment 3 
tests whether lie attributions are affected by whether the auditor comprehends the speaker’s lan-
guage. Experiment 4 uses regression analysis and causal search to investigate the relationship 
among judgments about five factors, including lie attributions and deceptive-intent attributions. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment tests whether lie attributions are affected by the audience’s ability to hear the 
agent’s spoken words. More specifically, we tested whether lie attributions are affected by 
whether the audience can hear the agent due to factors external or internal to the agent. The ex-
perimental design also allowed us to test whether lie attributions are based on attributing an as-
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sertion to the agent. To attribute an assertion is not merely to attribute the utterance of words. A 
verbal assertion requires uttering words and typically uttering a declarative sentence suffices to 
make an assertion. For instance, saying, “Allen is meeting a client,” is typically counted as as-
serting that Allen is meeting a client, which brings with it a commitment to the truth of that 
proposition. But this is not always the case. For example, an actor uttering those words on stage 
is not making an assertion. (For additional theoretical discussion and references, see Turri, 2010; 
Turri, 2012.) 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-five participants were tested (aged 18-83 years, mean age = 33 years; 
49 female; 91% reporting native competence in English). Participants were U.S. residents, re-
cruited and tested online using Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics, and compensated $0.40 
for approximately 2-3 minutes of their time. Repeat participation was prevented within and 
across experiments. We used the same recruitment and compensation procedures were used for 
all experiments reported here. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Ability: unable, able) × 2 
(Obstruction: external, internal) between-subjects design. Participants read a brief text and an-
swered three test statements. The story featured Samantha, whose co-worker Allen recently start-
 4
ed taking an extra coffee break in the morning. The boss asks Samantha where Allen is. Saman-
tha thinks (correctly) that he is taking an extra coffee break, but she tells the boss that he is meet-
ing a client. The Ability factor manipulated whether the boss was unable or able to hear Saman-
tha’s words. The Obstruction factor manipulated whether the potential obstruction was external 
or internal to Samantha. The external factor was noise from construction upstairs; the internal 
factor was a failing larynx. 
After reading the text, participants rated their agreement with three statements: 
1. Samantha lied. (Lied) 
2. Samantha asserted that Allen was meeting a client. (Asserted) 
3. The boss heard what Samantha said. (Heard) 
The first item was the critical measure of lie attributions. The second item measured whether 
people viewed Samantha as asserting the relevant proposition. The purpose of including this 
measure was to check whether an effect on lie attributions was mediated by assertion attribu-
tions. The third item was a check on the Ability manipulation. Response to these items was col-
lected on a standard 7-point Likert scale, 1 (“strongly disagree”) – 7 (“strongly agree”), left-to-
right across the participant’s screen. Each item appeared on a new screen and always in the order 
listed above. The story remained visible at the top of the screen throughout testing. The complete 
text of all stimuli is included in the Appendix. After testing, participants completed a brief demo-
graphic questionnaire. 
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Results 
The Ability manipulation was extremely effective, with participants strongly disagreeing that the 
boss heard Samantha in unable conditions and strongly agreeing that he heard her in the able 
conditions. (See Table 1.) An analysis of variance on response to the lie attribution revealed a 
main effect of Ability, F(1, 121) = 8.72, p = .004, ηp2 = .067, a trending effect of Obstruction, 
F(1, 121) = 2.99, p = .086, ηp2 = .024, and an interaction effect of Ability and Obstruction, F(1, 
121) = 7.95, p = .006, ηp2 = .062. (See Figure 1.) Because of the interaction, we conducted sepa-
rate follow-up independent samples t-tests for external and internal obstructions. When the ob-
struction was external, lie attributions were unaffected by whether the boss was able to hear 
Samantha, p = .912, but when the obstruction was internal, lie attributions were significantly 
lower when the boss was unable to hear Samantha, t(60) = -3.62, p < .001, d = 0.93. (See Figure 
1.) An analysis of variance on response to the assertion attribution revealed a main effect of Abil-
ity, F(1, 121) = 3.91, p = .050, ηp2 = .031, a trending effect of Obstruction, F(1, 121) = 3.11, p = .
080, ηp2 = .025, and no interaction, F(1, 121) = 1.53, p = .219. Assertion attribution was lower 
when the boss was unable to hear Samantha (M = 5.32, SD = 1.93) than when he was able to 
hear her (M = 5.89, SD = 1.34). 
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Table 1. Experiment 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Fig. 1. Experiment 1. Mean attribution of lying (Panel A) and assertion (Panel B) in the four 
conditions. Scales ran 1 (strongly disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). Error bars represent 95% confi-
dence intervals. 
If lie attributions are based on assertion attributions, then one might expect assertion attri-
butions to mediate the observed effect on lie attributions. To test the mediating role of assertion 
attributions on lie attributions, we conducted a bootstrap mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013). The 
analysis focused on the Internal conditions. We used assignment to Ability condition as the inde-
Unable Able
External
(N = 32)
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(N = 30)
External
(N = 31)
Internal
(N = 32)
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
lied 6.06 1.34 4.90 2.09 6.10 1.11 6.38 0.94
asserted 5.75 1.74 4.87 2.05 5.97 1.33 5.81 1.38
heard 1.56 0.80 1.50 1.14 6.06 1.39 5.69 1.91
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pendent variable (coded: 0 = unable, 1 = able), lie attribution as the outcome, and assertion attri-
bution as potential mediator. This analysis showed that assertion attributions significantly medi-
ated the effect of Ability on lie attributions: indirect effect = 0.39 [0.03, 1.05], direct effect = 1.09 
[0.32, 1.85]. (See Figure 2.) 
 
Fig. 2. Experiment 1. Mediation results. Parenthetical values represent the strength of a simple 
regression between the two variables; values outside the parentheses represent the strength of the 
relationships in a model used to test for mediation. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether lie attributions are affected by the audience’s ability to hear the 
agent’s spoken words. When the source of an audience’s inability was external to the speaker, the 
inability did not affect lie attributions. More specifically, when ambient noise prevented the audi-
ence from hearing the speaker, lie attributions did not differ from a control condition in which 
the audience was able to hear the speaker. By contrast, when the source of the audience’s inabili-
ty was internal to the speaker, the inability did affect lie attributions. More specifically, when a 
failure of the speaker’s larynx prevented the audience from hearing, lie attributions were signifi-
Ability
asserted
lied
(.267*)
.416***
.312**
(.423***)
(.500***)
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cantly lower than in a control condition in which the audience was able to hear. Mediation analy-
sis showed that this effect on lie attributions was mediated by participants’ judgments about 
whether the speaker made an assertion. That is, the effect on lie attributions was mediated by as-
sertion attributions. This provides some evidence that lie attributions are based on assertion attri-
butions, which supports the standard view that a lie is a type of assertion. 
Experiment 2 
This experiment tests whether lie attributions are affected by whether an audience is present to 
hear the agent speak. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-one new participants were tested (aged 19-64 years, mean age = 33 years; 40 female; 
97% reporting native competence in English). 
Materials and Procedure 
The basic testing procedures were very similar to those used in Experiment 1. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions (no audience, audience) in a between-subjects de-
sign. Participants read a brief text and answered three test statements. The story featured 
William, who works on a sales team whose current objective is to get new corporate customers. 
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William gets two new corporate customers in the morning then at lunchtime says that he got four 
new ones. The two conditions differed in whether everyone else had the day off, in which case 
no-one was around to hear William, or no-one had the day off, in which case there were people 
around to hear him. After reading the text, participants rated their agreement with three state-
ments: 
1. William lied. (Lied) 
2. William’s statement was intended to deceive. (Intended) 
3. William asserted that he got four new corporate customers. (Asserted) 
The first item was the critical measure of lie attributions. The second item measured whether 
people viewed William’s statement as deceptively motivated. The purpose of including this mea-
sure was to check whether lie attributions correlated with the attribution of deceptive intent. The 
third item measured whether people viewed William as making an assertion. The complete text 
of all stimuli is included in the Appendix. 
Results 
Independent samples t-tests revealed that assignment to condition (no audience, audience) mar-
ginally affected lie attributions, had a large effect on deceptive-intent attributions, and did not 
affect assertion attributions. (See Figure 3 and Table 2.) When there was no audience, mean lying 
attribution (M = 5.60, SD = 1.75) was higher than mean deceptive-intent attribution (M = 4.04, 
SD = 1.82), paired samples t-test, t(44) = 5.63, p < .001, d = 0.84. Nevertheless, lie attributions 
and deceptive-intent attributions were strongly positively correlated, r = .57, n = 91, p < .001. Lie 
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attributions and assertion attributions were also strongly positively correlated, r = .51, n = 91, p < 
.001. Deceptive-intent attributions and assertions attributions were moderately positively corre-
lated, r = .32, n = 91, p = .002. 
 
Fig. 3. Experiment 2. Mean attribution of lying, deceptive-intent, and assertion (within-subjects) 
in the two conditions (no audience, audience). Scales ran 1 (strongly disagree) - 7 (strongly 
agree). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2. Experiment 2. Independent samples t-tests. 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether lie attributions are affected by an audience’s presence. When 
there was an audience to hear the speaker’s false statement, participants judged that the speaker 
lied and intended to deceive. By contrast, when there was no audience to hear the speaker’s false 
statement, participants judged that the speaker lied but were ambivalent about the speaker’s in-
tent. Although the attributions of lying and deceptive intent were positively correlated, when 
there was no audience, mean lie attribution was much higher than mean deceptive-intent attribu-
tion. 
Experiment 3 
This experiment tests whether lie attributions are affected by whether the auditor can compre-
hend the language spoken by the agent. 
No audience
(N = 45)
Audience
(N = 46)
Measure M SD M SD t df p MD 95% CI d
lied 5.60 1.75 6.20 1.22 -1.89 78.52 .063 -0.60 -1.22, 0.03 0.43
intended 4.04 1.82 5.85 1.35 -5.36 81.09 <.001 -1.80 -2.47, -1.13 1.20
asserted 6.16 1.11 6.26 1.12 -0.45 89 .654 -0.11 -0.57, 0.36 0.10
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Method 
Participants 
Ninety-two new participants were tested (aged 19-68 years, mean age = 33 years; 42 female; 
98% reporting native competence in English). 
Materials and Procedure 
The basic testing procedures were very similar to those used in Experiment 2. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions (unable, able) in a between-subjects design. Partici-
pants read a brief text and answered three test statements. The story featured Fiona, who is trav-
eling abroad and who has not visited an art museum. During an elevator ride with a local person, 
Fiona tells him that she visited an art museum today. The two conditions differed in whether the 
local can comprehend English. In the unable condition, Fiona knows that the local cannot com-
prehend English and, thus, that there is no chance he could be deceived by her speech. In the able 
condition, Fiona knows that the local comprehends English very well and, thus, that he might be 
deceived by her speech. After reading the text, participants rated their agreement with three 
statements: 
1. Fiona lied. (Lied) 
2. Fiona’s statement was intended to deceive. (Intended) 
3. The local person understood Fiona’s statement. (Comprehended) 
The first item was the critical measure of lie attributions. The second item measured whether 
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people viewed Fiona’s statement as deceptively motivated. The third item was a check on the 
comprehension manipulation. The complete text of all stimuli is included in the Appendix. 
Results 
The manipulation was effective, with participants strongly disagreeing that the local understood 
in the unable condition, and strongly agreeing in the able condition. (See Table 3.) Independent 
samples t-tests revealed that assignment to condition (unable, able) did not affect lie attributions, 
but it had a large effect on deceptive-intent attributions, with attributions lower when the agent 
was unable to comprehend. (See Figure 4 and Table 3.) When the agent was unable to compre-
hend, mean lie attribution (M = 5.46, SD = 1.82) was higher than mean deceptive-intent attribu-
tion (M = 3.76, SD = 1.96), paired samples t-test, t(45) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.85. Nevertheless, 
lie attributions and deceptive-intent attributions were strongly positively correlated, r = .59, n = 
92, p < .001. 
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 Fig. 4. Experiment 3. Mean attribution of lying and deceptive intent (within-subjects) in the two 
conditions (unable, able). Scales ran 1 (strongly disagree) - 7 (strongly agree). Error bars repre-
sent 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 3. Experiment 3. Independent samples t-tests. 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether lie attributions are affected by whether the auditor can compre-
hend the language spoken by the agent. When the auditor could comprehend, participants strong-
ly attributed lying and deceptive intent to the agent. When the auditor could not comprehend, 
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Unable Able
Lied
Intended
Unable
(N = 46)
Able
(N = 46)
Measure M SD M SD t df p MD 95% CI d
lied 5.46 1.82 5.74 1.90 -0.73 90 .469 -0.28 -1.05, 0.49 0.15
intended 3.76 1.96 5.70 1.88 -4.83 90 <.001 -1.94 -2.73, -1.14 1.02
comprehended 1.67 0.76 6.15 1.15 -21.97 90 <.001 -4.48 -4.88, -4.07 4.63
 15
participants strongly attributed lying but did not attribute deceptive intent. This replicates a find-
ing from Experiment 2 whereby participants strongly attributed lying but, overall, were ambiva-
lent about deceptive intent.  
Experiment 4 
This experiment uses regression analysis and causal search to investigate the relationship among 
judgments about lying, deceptive intent, auditor comprehension, truth-value, and ethical evalua-
tion. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-one new participants were tested (aged 22-70 years, mean age = 33 years; 37 female; 
95% reporting native competence in English). 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (false, true) in a between-subjects 
design. Participants read a brief text and answered five test statements. The basic story was very 
similar to the one used for the unable condition in Experiment 3. The two conditions differed in 
whether Fiona’s statement is false (she said she visited a museum but did not) or true (she said 
she visited a museum and did). After reading the text, participants rated their agreement with five 
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statements: 
1. Fiona lied. (Lied) 
2. Fiona’s statement was intended to deceive. (Intended) 
3. It was unethical for Fiona to make that statement. (Unethical) 
4. The local person understood Fiona’s statement. (Comprehended) 
5. Fiona’s statement was false. (False) 
In contrast to the experiments reported above, the statements appeared all at once beneath the 
story in a matrix table and their order was randomized. The point of these procedural differences 
was to avoid order effects. Responses were collected using the same 7-point Likert scale as in 
previous experiments. The complete text of all stimuli is included in the Appendix. 
Results 
Independent samples t-tests revealed that assignment to condition (false, true) affected response 
to all dependent measures except for the comprehension attribution. (See Table 4.) We conducted 
a multiple linear regression analysis to assess which judgments significantly predicted lie attribu-
tions. The model included deceptive-intent attributions, ethical evaluations, comprehension attri-
butions, and falsity evaluation as predictors of lie attributions. (We did not include the indepen-
dent variable, which was a truth-value manipulation. Instead, we included the participants’ own 
evaluation of the relevant proposition’s truth-value.) The model was statistically significant and 
explained over 90% of the variance in lie attributions, F(4, 86) = 204.44, p < .001, R2 = .905. 
(See Table 5.) Deceptive-intent attributions and ethical evaluations did not significantly predict 
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lie attributions, but comprehension attributions and falsity evaluations did. Comprehension attri-
butions explained less than 1% of variance in lie attributions; falsity evaluations explained 44%. 
Table 4. Experiment 4. Independent samples t-tests. 
Table 5. Experiment 4. Multiple linear regression predicting lie attributions. 
To better understand the psychological processes involved in making these judgments, we 
also conducted a causal search with the Greedy Equivalence Search (GES) algorithm. Similar to 
regression-based mediation analysis and structural equation modeling, GES is used to make 
causal inferences from correlations and independence relations in a dataset. However, GES has 
certain advantages. Whereas mediation analysis and structural equal modeling assume a causal 
direction, GES does not. GES provides an overall measure of model fit and, given enough data, 
False
(N = 46)
True
(N = 45)
Measure M SD M SD t df p MD 95% CI d
lied 5.65 1.75 1.84 1.43 11.34 89 <.001 3.81 3.14, 4.48 2.40
intended 4.07 1.96 2.18 1.60 5.04 86.3 <.001 1.89 1.14, 2.63 1.09
unethical 3.87 1.96 2.20 1.60 4.44 89 <.001 1.67 0.92, 2.42 0.94
comprehended 1.91 1.15 1.73 1.03 0.78 89 .435 0.18 -0.28, 0.64 0.16
false 5.96 1.62 1.80 1.33 13.39 89 <.001 4.16 3.54, 4.77 2.84
Predictor B SE (B) β t p
intended .094 .065 .076 1.44 .153
unethical .087 .063 .069 1.37 .176
comprehended .198 .079 .087 2.50 .014
false .826 .042 .848 19.84 <.001
Constant -.371 .203 -1.83 .071
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will return the true causal model (Chickering, 2002). And GES is not limited to considering a 
single pre-specified model, which typically depends on theoretical assumptions. GES considers 
all possible models available given the different variables. Each variable is treated as a node. 
GES assigns an information score to the model in which all the nodes are disconnected — the 
“null model.” GES then evaluates adding causal arrows — “edges” — between the nodes (Meek 
1997 provides the edge orientation rules). GES adds edges that best improve the model’s infor-
mation score, if such edges exist, until adding more edges does not improve the information 
score. At this point, GES evaluates whether deleting any edges will further improve the informa-
tion score, and it deletes any such edges until deleting more edges does not improve the informa-
tion score. (For more on the general theory behind causal search, see Spirtes, Glymour & 
Scheines, 2000; Pearl, 2000.) 
The causal search was conducted using Tetrad 5.1.0 (http://www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/
tetrad/). We entered assignment to condition and response to the five dependent measures (lied, 
intended, unethical, comprehended, false) into a causal search using GES. The penalty discount 
was set to .75 and the model was constrained so that assignment to condition could not be caused 
by any other variable in the model. The algorithm returned a good fitting model for the data, 
χ2(10) = 11.46, p = .323, BIC = -33.65. Figure 5 depicts the best fitting model. In the model, lie 
attributions are caused by falsity evaluations and comprehension attributions; lie attributions 
cause deceptive-intent attributions, which in turn cause ethical evaluations. The causal link from 
falsity evaluations to lie attributions was the strongest relationship among any dependent vari-
ables in the model. 
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 Fig. 5. Experiment 4. Causal search results. Arrows represent directional causal relations; path 
coefficients represent the strength of the causal relation. Reference class for condition: false. 
Discussion 
This experiment used regression analysis and causal search to investigate the relationships 
among judgments about lying, deceptive intent, auditor comprehension, truth-value, and ethical 
evaluation. The results from the two procedures were broadly similar. In the regression analysis, 
lie attributions were significantly predicted by judgments about auditor comprehension and eval-
uations of truth-value, but not by attributions of deceptive intent or ethical evaluations. In the 
best fitting causal model for the data, lie attributions were caused by judgments about auditor 
comprehension and evaluations of truth-value; moreover, lie attributions caused attributions of 
deceptive intent, which reverses the direction one might expect given the standard view of lying. 
General Discussion 
Results from four experiments shed further light on the ordinary concept of lying and lie attribu-
tions. The research took place against the backdrop of a standard definition of lying, according to 
false
intended
liedCondition
-4.16
comprehendedunethical
0.91
0.260.53
0.71
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which a lie is a dishonest assertion (i.e. you lie if and only if you make an assertion that you 
think is false in order to deceive your audience). In Experiment 1, lie attributions were affected 
by the audience’s ability to hear the agent’s spoken words. When the source of the audience’s 
inability was internal to the speaker (a debilitated larynx), lie attributions were significantly low-
er than in a control condition in which the audience was able to hear. This effect on lie attribu-
tions was mediated by participants’ judgments about whether the speaker made an assertion (as-
sertion attributions). In Experiment 2, when an agent was alone and no-one could hear his words, 
participants strongly attributed lying but did not attribute deceptive intent. In Experiment 3, 
when the auditor could not comprehend the speaker’s language, participants again strongly at-
tributed lying but did not attribute deceptive intent. In Experiment 4, lie attributions were caused 
by judgments about auditor comprehension and evaluations of truth-value, but not by attributions 
of deceptive intent. Instead, lie attributions caused attributions of deceptive intent. 
These findings advance knowledge of the ordinary concept of lying and lie attributions in 
several ways. First and foremost, they suggest that deceptive intent is less central to the ordinary 
concept of lying than previously thought. When an agent falsely asserted a proposition with no-
one around to hear, or to an auditor who could not comprehend the language, participants strong-
ly judged that the agent lied without also attributing deceptive intent to the agent (Experiments 2 
and 3). Moreover, in other contexts, deceptive-intent attributions did not significantly predict lie 
attributions. Instead, on the best fitting causal model for the data, deceptive-intent attributions 
were actually a consequence of lie attributions, rather than a cause (Experiment 4). This supports 
some theories of lying, which claim that deceptive intent is inessential to it (Sorenson, 2007; 
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Carson, 2006; Fallis, 2009). It also fits with recent experimental work, which found that partici-
pants attributed lies in contexts where, according to the researchers, the agent lacked an intention 
to deceive (Arico & Fallis, 2013, Experiment 1). However, one concern about this result, noted 
by the researchers themselves, is its assumption that participants shared the researchers’ interpre-
tation of the case. Participants still might have attributed deceptive intent. By contrast, the 
present research avoided this concern by having participants judge deceptive intent for them-
selves. 
Suppose it turns out to be a robust finding that lie attributions cause deceptive-intent attri-
butions, rather than vice versa. This fact, all by itself, is still consistent with the ordinary concept 
of lying being partly constituted by its relation to deceptive intent. For instance, some researchers 
distinguish between “containment” and “inferential” models of conceptual structure (Laurence & 
Margolis, 1999, p. 5). On the containment model, the concept of lying would be constituted by 
other concepts, including the concepts of assertion and falsity and, perhaps also, deceptive intent. 
Given a concept structured this way, a lie attribution would be partly constituted by a deceptive-
intent attribution, and it would not be possible for the former to cause the latter. By contrast, on 
the inferential model, a concept is constituted by a set of inferential dispositions to apply other 
concepts. On this model, a lie attribution need not be informed by a prior deceptive-intent attri-
bution. That is, a lie attribution could occur without a deceptive-intent attribution occurring. In-
stead, a lie attribution need only generate a disposition to attribute deceptive intent. And this is 
consistent with our finding that lie attributions caused deceptive-intent attributions. Indeed, one 
possibility that fits well with our results is that the concept of lying is a containment/inferential 
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hybrid. For instance, it could be that the concept of lying is partly constituted by a containment 
relation with falsity and assertion, and partly constituted by an inferential relation with deceptive 
intent. This would explain the causal modeling results from Experiment 4. 
Of course, we are not confidently proposing this hybrid model based on our findings here. 
Our primary goal is merely to flag a potentially fruitful avenue of future research on the concept 
of lying, based on more general theoretical distinctions researchers have proposed about the na-
ture of concepts. Also consistent with our results is the hypothesis that the relationship between 
lying and deceptive intent is merely correlational rather than conceptual. 
Second, prior work has assumed that lies were a species of assertion (e.g. Coleman & Kay,
1981), but little if any evidence exists that this accurately reflects the ordinary concept. We found 
evidence that people’s lie attributions are sensitive to their assertion attributions (Experiment 1). 
As far as we are aware, the present research is the first to measure assertion attributions and pro-
vide evidence that lie attributions are based on them. 
Third, prior work has shown that lie attributions are sensitive to contextual features, such as 
the purpose of the conversational exchange (informative versus politeness) (Lee & Ross, 1997). 
Our results suggest that lie attributions are also sensitive to contextual features related to audi-
ence uptake. In particular, lie attributions are sometimes based on whether the audience compre-
hends the speaker’s language (Experiment 4). The observed influence of comprehension attribu-
tions on lie attributions was very small, explaining less than 1% of variance in lie attributions. 
However, this occurred in a context where we did not manipulate audience comprehension. One 
possibility for future work, then, is to manipulate this factor in order to see whether it can play a 
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larger role. 
Fourth, theorists have argued that there are different types of lie, including “straightforward 
lies,” “bald-faced lies,” “confused lies,” “proviso lies,” and “white lies” (e.g. Arico & Fallis, 
2013; Peterson, Peterson & Seeto, 1983). Our results suggest a potentially surprising addition to 
this list: private lies. When an agent asserted a proposition that he presumably knew was false, 
people strongly judged that it was a lie regardless of whether he did so publicly with others 
around, or privately when he was alone. Not only does this result suggest that intending to de-
ceive your audience is inessential to lying, but it also suggests that no audience is needed. Of 
course, whenever you assert, you are present. Future work could investigate whether people in-
terpret private lies as attempts to deceive oneself. 
Finally, existing findings suggest that objective falsity is essential to the ordinary concept of 
lying. But no clear picture has emerged about how important objective falsity is. For instance, 
some results suggest that objective falsity is the least important feature of a lie (Coleman & Kay, 
1981, p. 35). By contrast, other results suggest that objective falsity is enormously important. In 
one study, the switch from an objectively false to an objectively true statement caused lie attribu-
tions to drop from ceiling (90%) to floor (10%) (Turri & Turri, 2015). The present results provide 
further evidence that objective falsity is essential and centrally important to the ordinary concept 
of lying. In the best-fitting causal model of data from one study, evaluations of a statement’s fal-
sity were by far the strongest cause of lie attributions (Experiment 4) and uniquely explained 
nearly half of the variance in lie attributions. 
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Appendix: Stimuli 
Experiment 1 
External obstacle (unable/able) 
Samantha’s co-worker Allen recently started taking an extra coffee break in the morning. One 
morning the boss visits Samantha’s unit and asks, “Where is Allen?” Samantha thinks that Allen 
is taking an extra coffee break, so she says, “He’s meeting a client.” (In fact, Allen is out on a 
coffee break.) Just as Samantha spoke, the volume of noise from the construction upstairs 
changed suddenly and the boss was [able/completely unable] to hear what she said. 
Internal obstacle (unable/able) 
Samantha’s co-worker Allen recently started taking an extra coffee break in the morning. One 
morning the boss visits Samantha’s unit and asks, “Where is Allen?” Samantha thinks that Allen 
is taking an extra coffee break, so she says, “He’s meeting a client.” (In fact, Allen is out on a 
coffee break.) Just as Samantha spoke, her severely weak larynx suddenly failed [but the boss 
was able/and the boss was completely unable] to hear what she said. 
1. Samantha lied. 
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2. Samantha asserted that Allen was meeting a client. 
3. The boss heard what Samantha said. 
Experiment 2 
(No audience/audience) William is a part of a sales team at work. Their major objective this 
month is to get new corporate customers. This morning in his cubicle at work, William made 
many calls and got two new corporate customers. At the water cooler during lunch, William says, 
“I got four new corporate customers this morning.” [It’s Saturday and everyone else had the day 
off: William was alone and no-one was around to hear him. / It’s Saturday but no-one had the day 
off: William was not alone and people were around to hear him.] 
1. William lied. 
2. William’s statement was intended to deceive. 
3. William asserted that he got four new corporate customers. 
Experiment 3 
Unable 
Fiona is traveling abroad. She speaks only English, not the local language. Fiona has not been to 
an art museum. This evening, a local person is the only one in an elevator with Fiona. Fiona 
knows that this local person clearly cannot speak or comprehend a word of English. Fiona says 
to him, in English, “Today I visited an art museum.” Because this person cannot comprehend a 
word of English, Fiona knows that he will not understand her and, thus, there is no chance of de-
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ceiving him. 
Able 
Fiona is traveling abroad. She speaks only English, not the local language. Fiona has not been to 
an art museum. This evening, a local person is the only one in an elevator with Fiona. Fiona 
knows that this local person clearly can speak and comprehend English fluently. Fiona says to 
him, in English, “Today I visited an art museum.” Because this person speaks and comprehends 
English fluently, Fiona knows that he will understand her and, thus, there is a chance of deceiv-
ing him. 
1. Fiona lied. 
2. Fiona’s statement was intended to deceive. 
3. The local person understood Fiona’s statement. 
Experiment 4 
(False/true) Fiona is traveling abroad. She speaks only English, not the local language. Fiona 
[did not visit/visited] an art museum today. This evening, a local person is the only one in an ele-
vator with Fiona. Fiona knows that this local person clearly cannot speak or comprehend a word 
of English. Fiona says to him, in English, “Today I visited an art museum.” Because this person 
cannot comprehend a word of English, Fiona knows that he will not understand her and, thus, 
that he will not believe what she said. 
1. Fiona lied. 
2. Fiona’s statement was intended to deceive. 
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3. It was unethical for Fiona to make that statement. 
4. The local person understood Fiona’s statement. 
5. Fiona’s statement was false. 
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